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I.     Introduction 
 
  It is often argued that high wage or labor costs in Western Europe are the 
driving force behind the increasing business practice of international outsourcing 
across industries (see  e.g. Stefanova (2006) and Amiti and Wei, (2005)). One 
reason for the wage gap to Eastern Europe or Asian countries is the difference in 
labor market institutions. Typically in Western Europe, wages for low-skilled 
workers are set by the government via minimum wage arrangements or determined 
by bilateral bargaining between firms or employer federations and labor unions. In 
opposite, unions in Eastern European or Asian countries are much weaker or wages 
are determined by market forces. Therefore, flexible outsourcing, which is decided 
after knowing the domestic production costs, is a significant threat for employment 
in the low-skilled segment in industrialized countries. To working against this threat 
and making domestic production more attractive, lower wages or higher 
productivity are needed. This can be realized by the introducing a profit sharing 
scheme, which is often expressed by labor unions or politics. Due to this scheme the 
relationship of income and wage will be released. Thus, the same income can be 
derived with a lower wage.    
  Although profit sharing is an important phenomenon in OECD countries
1, 
the productivity effect of such a participation in firm’s success is ambiguous.
2 It is 
argued, that due to profit sharing motivation and identification with the firm is 
stimulated and thus effort respectively productivity increases. On the other hand, if 
workers share in the firm’s profit, the incentive of manager to shirk the monitoring 
function increases, which decreases the productivity. Additionally, there could be 
free riding behaviour, since if there are n  employees and profits will be equally 
distributed, so that an individual receives only  n / 1  of the extra profits, which lead 
to fewer incentives to increase effort.   
  However, profit sharing will also affect the wage bargaining. Concerning 
the wage effect of profit sharing several studies confirm that higher profit sharing 
                                                 
1        Pendleton et al. (2001) have presented detailed data on profit sharing schemes in 14 OECD 
countries. For further evidence regarding the incidence of profit sharing, see also Estrin et al. 
(1997) and Conyon and Freeman (2004). 
2   For an increasing effect on productivity see Cable and Fitzroy (1980), while, Jensen and 
Meckling (1979), and Kruse (1993) demonstrate negative productivity effects of profit 
sharing.  3
will decrease the bargained wage by labor unions.
3 This results since higher wages 
decrease the profit of a firm and thus decrease the profit income of the worker or 
union member. Due to this loss, the union’s marginal costs of an increasing wage 
are higher and therefore, higher profit sharing will induce a less aggressive wage 
setting. 
  Bringing the finding concerning the  relationship between domestic wage 
level and outsourcing activities plus the wage decreasing effect of profit sharing 
together, one would expect that profit sharing will lower outsourcing demand. 
However, as it is shown in Koskela and König (2009), profit sharing could decrease 
the bargained wage and therefore outsourcing activities, but if the labor union sets 
also the effort or productivity level, the firm will desist from implementing a profit 
sharing scheme. Thus, there is no effect of profit sharing on outsourcing demand.    
  In contrast to Koskela and König (2009), in this paper we combine profit 
sharing and outsourcing, if the wage for worker is decided by a labor union but 
effort is decided by the worker. In this context, we analyze the impacts of profit 
sharing on firm’s incentive to outsource domestic production by answering the 
following three questions: First, how does the implementation of profit sharing 
affect effort and thus productivity? Second, how does profit sharing influence the 
bargained wage and thus outsourcing demand? Third, will the firm implement a 
profit sharing scheme, if workers decide individually about effort provision?    
  We find that profit sharing and the wage level have an individual effort-
augmenting effect and therefore increase productivity. This results from the fact, 
that higher profit sharing increases the income, which sets incentive to increase the 
profit due to higher effort. Concerning our second question, we demonstrate that the 
wage effect of profit sharing is ambiguous. On the one hand, there is a wage 
decreasing substitution effect, but on the other hand, there is a wage increasing 
effect via labor demand elasticity. Therefore, the outsourcing or employment effect 
is also ambiguous. To our third question, we find that there will be a profit sharing 
scheme, which characterize a difference to Koskela and König (2009). 
                                                 
3   See e.g. Weitzman (1987), Wadhwani (1988), Fung (1989), Holmlund (1990) and Koskela 
and Stenbacka (2006). However, there are also empirical studies, such as Wadhwani and 
Wall (1990) and Kraft and Ugarkovic (2005), which show that profit sharing does not 
reduce the wage.  4
  We proceed as follows. Section II presents the time sequences of decisions. 
Also, the labor and outsourcing demand and employee effort are presented. Section 
III investigates the wage formation by monopoly labor union and the optimal profit 
share. Finally, we present conclusions in section IV. 
 
 
II.   The Basic Framework and Optimal Flexible Outsourcing, 
Labor Demand and Individual Employee Effort 
 
We assume that output depends not only on domestic labor and international 
outsourcing, but also on the effort by workers, i.e. the workers’ productivity. This 
lies in conformity with the efficiency wage hypothesis.
4 We analyze the following 
timing decision, which captures the idea that the representative firm is flexible to 
decide about the amount of outsourcing simultaneously with domestic labor 
demand, but commits to profit sharing before wage determination. After the firm 
has decided about profit sharing, the monopoly labor union sets the wage given the 
profit share level. Knowing the base wage the representative firm determines 
outsourcing and employment. If the wage and profit share level is known, the 
representative worker decides on effort provision. We summarize these timing 
decisions in Figure 1. The decisions at each stage are analyzed by using backward 
induction. 
 
Figure 1:  Time sequences of decisions in terms of outsourcing, employment, effort, 
wage formation and profit sharing  
 
   Flexible outsourcing and committed profit sharing: 
 
   Stage 1    Stage 2        Stage 3              
 
        
   profit           wage          outsourcing M , labor demand L 
   sharing τ                 formation w         and effort determination  i e   
  
                                                 
4            See e.g. the book edited by Akerlof and Yellen (1986), which includes the main initial 
efficiency wage papers about (i) shirking models, (ii) labor turnover models, (iii) adverse 
selection models and (iv) sociological models.  5
 
  First we characterize the optimal labor and outsourcing demand by the 
representative firm and the effort by the representative worker by taking profit 
sharing and wage formation as given. The concave production function with respect 
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where the price of the output is normalized to unity, L is the amount of domestic 
labor and M  the firm’s labor input acquired from external suppliers through 
outsourcing. The parameter e  describes the total average effort of the firm’s 
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5 As one can 
see from (1), we assume that domestic effective labor,  L e ,  and outsourcing, M , 
are perfect substitutes.  
 
 
II.1.   Outsourcing and Domestic Labor Demand 
 
The firm decides on domestic labor and outsourcing to maximize the profit 
function  
 
{ () ( ) M f wL M L e Max
M L






.                                   (2) 
 
by taking the average effort, e , wage, w,  and profit sharing, τ , as given. For the 
cost of outsourcing, we assume there are some other costs associated with 
outsourcing such as the price of the intermediate goods. Such costs could be costs 
for transport, which are exponential increasing with higher outsourcing. To allow 
                                                 
5   A specification, which is also common in the literature, describes effort as the fraction of 
working hours that the worker actually works. Since the number of working hours is 
normalized to 1, the choice of an individual is  ( ) 1 ; 0 ∈ i e  and thus ( ) i e − 1  characterizes the 
fraction of time spent shirking. Following this  L e  is the whole actual working time.  6
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α ,                                (3a) 
                     
e c
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M =  .                                                                               (3b) 
 
In the case of perfect substitutability domestic labor demand is a negative function 
of wage and the amount of outsourcing and a positive function of both outsourcing 
cost and effort. Higher outsourcing will decrease domestic labor demand, which lies 
in conformity with empirics.
6 However, labor demand does not directly depend on 
profit sharing, which lies also in conformity with empirical evidence.
7 
  At this stage, we can also look on the direct labor demand elasticities. In the 
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= η , can be written as  














η ,                                                                (4a) 













η .                                               (4b) 
 
 
II.2.   Individual Employee Effort  
 
          By  following  the  efficiency  wage  literature  we  assume  for  the  employed 
worker that the utility function is additively separable in income and effort, where 
the utility depends positively on the wage and profit income and negatively on the 
disutility of effort. The employed worker receives an income of  y , which includes 
                                                 
6         See e.g. Görg and Hanley (2005). 
7         See e.g. Wadwani and Wall (1990) and Cahuc and Dormont (1997).  7
both the wage w and the profit income 
L
π




τ + = . The idea behind this is that the workers are assumed a team. The 
whole team gets the profit share  π τ ⋅ , what is distributed equally to the member. 
However, to get the profit income, it causes effort provision of a worker. Since 
worker dislikes effort provision, it is associated with a disutility, which can be 
describe by  ( ) e g , where  ()
γ γ
/ 1 e e g ⋅ =  is assumed to be a convex function with 
1 0 < <γ  so that  () () 0 '
1 / 1 > =
− γ e e g  and  ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) 0 1 / 1 ' '
2 / 1 > − =
− γ γ e e g .  
Since the profit is equally distributed, every (homogenous) worker gets the 
same per capita profit income, but he/she realizes the individual disutility for 
providing a certain effort level. Thus there is space for a free-rider behavior by the 
single worker, which means that there is an incentive for shirking. The biggest 
problem of firm’s owner is to solve this moral hazard problem and to verify the 
individual effort. However, in the discussion of the free-rider problem interaction of 
the group member and peer pressure are often neglected. Due to the implementation 
of profit sharing there are incentives in the group to internalize the externalities of 
free-riding and avoiding shirking, since it sets some incentive to observe each other 
and interact.
8 This can build up a peer pressure to provide the individual effort 
resulting from individual utility maximization and eliminate the moral hazard 
problem concerning the free-rider behavior. Following Kandel and Lazear (1992), 
we motivate this peer pressure as a social group norm. Due to the observation, the 
individual fells shame or guilty if the individual effort is below this norm, since it 
lowers the income for each of the team member. However, also an effort above the 
norm will decrease the individual utility, since now the other team member will feel 
shame. Thus any deviation from the norm will lead to a utility loss. Therefore, the 
peer pressure function can be written simply as  ( ) ( )
2 ~
i i e e e P − = , where e ~  is the 
social norm and defined as the average effort of all other worker than i.9    
                                                 
8   See Holmstrom (1982), Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990) and Varian (1990). Radner (1986) 
shows, that in repeated games the free-rider problem can be eliminated even if the players 
cannot observe other players’ actions or information, but can observe the consequences. 
9   We assume that every group member can verify the effort of the others, but the firm owner 
cannot do this. The punishment of the shirking or over motivated members is a utility loss and 
not an income loss, and can be interpreted as mental harassment or social exclusion.   8
From this framework we can write the utility of a single employed individual 
in (5a) and of an unemployed individual in (5b)  
 
()
2 / 1 ~
i i e e e
L
w v − − − + =
γ γ
π
τ ,                                                       (5a) 
b v = .                                  (5b) 
 
The worker’s problem is to choose the level of individual effort to maximize its 
utility. For simplicity of analysis, suppose that observation of team member is 









10 Thus the optimal individual provided effort level results from 
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1 / 1 γ π
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.                                                           (6) 
 
Since we focus on individual effort determination, the effect on employment will be 
not taken into account. Therefore,  e e F π =  holds and using the production function 


















, we obtain  ()
1 − + = ⋅ =
α M L e e F F e e e . 
Inserting the labor and outsourcing demand, equations (3a) and (3b), we find for the 
individual effect on profit  e w F π e e / = = . Since we also assume Nash-behaviour, 
where every worker takes the effort of the others as given, the individual chooses an 
effort level equal to the group norm. However, every group member faces the same 
calculus, which means that the group norm corresponds to the average effort level. 
Assuming homogenous workers, the average effort level equals individual effort 
and thus effort level which would be chosen without any peer pressure. Finally, we 
have  e e e = = ~ . Using this, we get from solving equation (6) the effort function   
 
                                                 
10    In our framework we assume Nash behavior, where every worker chooses his/her effort 
taking the effort of others as given. So there is no effect of effort provision by the other 
workers and thus no effect on the social norm. See also Lin et al. (2002). 
11   The index i  has been dropped for notational convenience.  9












e e .                                                        (7) 
 
Therefore, the optimal effort by the representative worker is influenced by the 
income parts, but outsourcing will have no direct effect.  
Since changes in wage and profit income affect all workers, every single 
worker will adjust its effort and thus the average effort will change. These effects 
































, so that the wage and profit 
sharing enhance productivity by increasing effort provision and positively affect 
labor demand indirectly, which lies in conformity with empirics.
12  
Important for the next analysis is the wage elasticity of effort. In our 
framework we find as   
 









































γ ,                                (8) 
 
so that the elasticity of effort in terms of wage is only one if we have the specific 
parameter 2 / 1 = γ  for the disutility of effort.
13 According to (8) the effort elasticity 
increases (decreases) if the disutility of effort becomes less (more) convex. Since 
we are interested in the effect of profit sharing if the wage is determined by a labor 
union, we have to assume  2 / 1 < γ . The reason for that assumption is that only in 
this case the low skilled wage setting by the labor union would be binding.  
For the effort elasticity concerning profit sharing we found that it is positive, 













We can now summarize our findings as. 
                                                 
12       See e.g. Booth and Frank (1999), Cable and Wilson (1990), Cahuc and Dormont (1997), 
Kruse (1992), Lynn Hannan (2005) and Wadhwani and Wall (1990).  
13       In a dynamic efficiency wage model in the absence of outsourcing Jellal and Zenou (2000) 
have received the same result in terms of effort wage elasticity.    10
 
Proposition 1: Profit income and base wage have an individual effort-
augmenting effect and thus increase productivity, whereas the  wage  
elasticity of effort depends on the parameter of disutility of effort so that 
it can be smaller, equal to, or higher than one.   
 
For the above mentioned reason, in the following analysis, we concentrate on the 
case when the wage elasticity of effort is smaller than one, i.e.  1 < φ .     
 
 
III.    Wage Formation by Monopoly Labor Union and Committed 
Profit Sharing 
 
Now we analyze the stage when the representative firm commits to profit 
sharing before the wage formation by allowing for their effects on wage setting, 
labor demand and effort determination. 
 
III.1. Wage Formation under Committed Profit Sharing  
 
         We first analyze the wage formation by the monopoly union (see also Cahuc 
and Zylberberg (2004), p. 401-403) by taking profit sharing as given and by 
assuming that the union behaves utilitaristic in the presence of effort determination. 
Therefore the objective function of monopoly labor union is assumed to be 
() v L N vL V − + = , which we can rewrite by using equations (5a) and (5b) to 
maximize the surplus anticipating domestic labor demand, outsourcing and effort 
determination according to 
 
          { ( ) () bN L b e g w V Max
w
+ + − − = π τ ,  s.t.                                          (9)  
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where b  captures the exogenous minimum income for labor union members N .    
         We get following as the first order condition  
  11
() () ( )




























τ ,         (10)  
 
where the overall wage effect on the profit includes the direct wage effect and the 
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1
1  the first-order condition (10) can be 
solved to   
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/ 1 e b
w .                                                                (11)      
 
From equation (11) one can see that profit sharing will affect the wage in different 
ways. The first working channel is the direct effect, which one can see in the 
denominator of (11), while the second is an indirect effect via the total wage 
elasticity and via effort, respectively via the wage elasticity of effort. Starting with 
the direct effect, which is described in the denominator of (11), we see that this one 
can be distinguished into two working channels. The first part of the term  τφ τ −  
describes the substitution effect. This effect will decrease the base wage, which 
means that a former part of the base wage is substituted by profit income. Since 
wage changes also affect effort provision, the second part of the term describes a 
feedback effect via the elasticity channel. Since a higher wage will decrease profit 
and therefore profit income, so that it increases the resulting utility loss for the 
union respectively their member. Due to this increasing effect on the union’s 
marginal costs, higher profit sharing will induce a less aggressive wage setting.  
The indirect second working channel is affected by the effect on the labor 
demand elasticity, effort and wage elasticity of effort. We know that higher profit 
sharing increase effort and thus productivity. Intuitively, the higher productivity 
will be compensated by a higher wage level, which one can also see from equation 
(11). Another indirect impact results from the effect on the wage elasticity of the 
labor demand. As pointed out in Appendix A, higher profit sharing makes the labor  12





, which affects the wage positively. For this result 
an intuitive explanation can be found. Since higher profit sharing increases effort 
and induces a higher labor demand (see (3a)). An enhanced labor decreases the 
utility loss of the union concerning a higher wage, which results in a more 
aggressive union and a higher wage level. While these effects raise the wage, the 
effect via the wage elasticity of effort is ambiguous. Using equation (8) and the 









. As one can see from (11) higher profit sharing 
will have a wage increasing effect (numerator) but also a wage decreasing effect 
(denominator). Due to this opposed effects we cannot identify the impact of profit 
sharing on bargained base wage. 
We now turn to a detailed mathematically analysis between profit sharing and 
wage formation originally in the case when the wage elasticity of effort is smaller 


































 we can rewrite equation 
(11) as follows 
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It should be emphasized that the wage is an implicit form as both the numerator and 
denominator in the mark-up factor,  ( ) τ , ,w c A , depend on wage w in a non-linear 
way via labor demand and direct wage elasticity of labor demand.  










 and by substituting  A w b / =  we can characterize this effect on wage 
formation as   
 












,                                                                   (12) 
  13
where  0 1 > −
A
w Aw  under the assumption  1
1













γ τ   (see Appendix B).  
In terms of profit sharing in Appendix B we point out that there are two 
effects which influence the term 
A

















⎛ − − ≤
L
γ τ , the second impact will be negative if outsourcing 







Therefore, under these assumptions effect of profit sharing on wage formation is a 
priori ambiguous, which means that  ? =
A
w A τ  if  1 < φ .  
We can summarize our finding as follows.
14 
        
Proposition 2:  In the presence of flexible outsourcing when the base 
wage elasticity of effort is smaller than one higher profit sharing will 
















⎛ − − ≤
L
γ τ and when outsourcing is not too high relative to 






.   
 
However, we can also analyze the impact of profit sharing on wage for the special 
case  2 / 1 = γ  where the wage elasticity of effort is one, i.e.  1 = φ . In this case, the 
effect of profit sharing can be expressed as 
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14       One can also show in this model that lower cost of outsourcing decreases wage formation 
















⎛ − − ≤
L
γ τ . Lower outsourcing cost means for given wage 
level a higher outsourcing demand and a more elastic low skilled labor demand. Thus the 
opportunity for the labor union to set higher wages falls. This lies in conformity with empirics 
concerning evidence from various countries, e.g. Feenstra and Hanson (1999), Hijzen et al. 
(2005), Hsieh and Woo (2005), Egger and Egger (2006), Geishecker and Görg (2008) and 
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L e
M
 and  
  
We can now summarize this finding as. 
 
Corollary 1: In the presence of flexible outsourcing when the base 
wage elasticity of effort is one higher profit sharing will have a negative 
effect on wage formation when outsourcing is sufficiently low relative to 
effective domestic labor. 
 
Knowing the wage effects, we can demonstrate the effects of committed profit 
sharing on outsourcing and  employment. We can write the working channel of 
committed profit sharing on the amount of flexible outsourcing as 
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. Using the former 
results, we in the general case with, i.e.  1 < φ    
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 is fulfilled, we know from 
equation (13) that  0
1
<
= φ τ d
dw
. In that case, we therefore find for the impact of profit 
sharing on outsourcing  
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Based on the outsourcing effect of profit sharing, one can also analyze the effect of 
committed profit sharing on employment. The employment impact can be 
formalized as 
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the former results, we have in the general case  15
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For the special case when the wage elasticity of effort is one and outsourcing is 













, by using our former 
results, we have  
 
























.                                             (17) 
 
We can now summarize these findings as.  
 
Proposition 3: The effect of profit sharing on flexible outsourcing and 
domestic employment has  
(a)  an ambiguous effect and when base wage elasticity of effort smaller 
than one ( ) 1 < φ , and profit sharing elasticity of labor demand is 
smaller than  one, while  
(b) a negative effect on flexible outsourcing and a positive effect on 
employment when base wage elasticity of effort is one  ) 1 ( = φ , and 
profit sharing elasticity of labor demand is smaller than one. 
 
 
III.2. Optimal Committed Profit Sharing  
 
         Concerning the timing structure presented in Section II the representative firm 
has been assumed to commit to profit sharing to maximize profit subject to 
domestic labor demand (3a), outsourcing (3b), effort determination (7) and wage 
formation (11’) so that  we have to analyze the following specification 
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From (18) we get the first-order condition  ( ) 0 1
* * = − + − τ π τ π , where the indirect 





















π . Concerning the derivate of the 


























*  so that the optimal committed profit sharing 
in the presence of flexible outsourcing is  
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. This is 
an implicit form for profit sharing because both employee effort and labor demand 
depend on profit sharing in a non-linear way and both numerator and denominator 
depend on outsourcing.  
Using the first-order condition  ( )
* * 1 π π τ τ = ⋅ −  and  0
* > π  one can answer our 
third research question and show that the firm will implement a profit sharing 
scheme. This results, since the right-side is positive and therefore to fulfill this 
equation also the left side has to be positive. If  0
* > τ π  this will be the case for 
1 0 < <τ . For the case  0
* < τ π  the profit share has to be higher than one, i.e. 
1 > τ . Thus, one can conclude that the optimal profit share is at least positive. 
 
Proposition 4: For individual effort provision, the firm will optimally 
implement a profit sharing scheme. 
 
Koskela and König (2009) have analyzed committed profit sharing in the case of 
labour union determination of wage and effort and by showing a constant effort  17
level will result so that in this case firm’s optimal choice of profit sharing is zero. 
The difference between both approaches is that now the firm will induce higher 
productivity with the implementation of profit sharing, while this does not happen 
in Koskela and König (2009). Therefore the firm will not lose due to profit sharing.  
This result shows that the time structure with individual effort determination will 
generate an alternative compensation scheme with profit sharing, while in the 




IV.  Conclusions 
 
Associated outsourcing and committed profit sharing under labor market 
imperfection with flexible outsourcing we have analyzed the following questions: 
First, how does the implementation of profit sharing affect effort and thus 
productivity? Second, how does profit sharing influence the bargained wage and 
thus outsourcing demand? Third, will the firm implement a profit sharing scheme, if 
workers decide individually about effort provision?    
  We have found the intuitive result that profit sharing and the wage level have 
an individual effort-augmenting effect and therefore increase productivity. This 
results from the fact, that higher profit sharing increases the income, which set 
incentive to increase the working effort to realize more profit and therefore to 
increase the income. Concerning our second question, we demonstrate that the wage 
effect of profit sharing is ambiguous. On the hand, there is a wage decreasing 
substitution effect, but on the other hand, there is a wage increasing effect via labor 
demand elasticity. Therefore, the outsourcing and employment effect is also 
ambiguous. To your third question, we find that there will be a firm’s optimally 
committed profit sharing under individual effort determination. This result shows 
that to the individual effort provision and therefore the productivity effect is 
decisive to implement an alternative compensation scheme where the income is 
uncoupled on the wage. 
An important new research question would be to analyze the impacts of both 
product market and labor market imperfections on profit sharing, wage, outsourcing  18
and unemployment. In the absence of profit sharing Lommerud et al. (2006) have 
shown how international mergers might restrain the market power of unions in 
oligopoly markets giving socially excessive incentives for international mergers, 
unless products are close substitutes. An additional aspect might be the analysis of 
the effects on outsourcing, if profit sharing is implemented in the wage bargaining, 
where simultaneous the profit share and wage will be determined.  
 
Appendix  A:  Calculations of the total and direct own wage 
elasticities in terms of wage, outsourcing cost and 
profit sharing 
 
In our framework, the base wage w affects labor demand in two different ways and 
thus we can separate the elasticity in an direct labor demand effect and an indirect 
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= φ . The special 
assumption 2 / 1 = γ  gives  1 = η . The total wage elasticity can be presented in 
terms of direct wage elasticity as   


















< γ ,                                            (A2) 
so that there is the positive relationship between the total wage elasticity and the  
direct own wage elasticity in the case  2 / 1 < γ .   
          The effect of wage rate on the direct own wage elasticity (using equation 
(4a)) can be expressed as 
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                                                                                 19
Under the assumption that the wage elasticity of effort is smaller than one, higher 
wage will increase the direct own wage elasticity so that in this case it will also 
increase the total wage elasticity of labor demand according to equation (A2). 
         Finally, the effect of profit sharing on the direct own wage elasticity (using 


















































.                (A4) 
 
According to this higher profit sharing will decrease the direct own wage 
elasticity.
15 Therefore, in terms of total wage elasticity of labor demand when wage 
elasticity of effort being smaller than one,  1 < φ , higher wage and also lower 
outsourcing cost will increase the total wage elasticity of labor demand 












 while higher profit sharing  will decrease the total wage 

















Appendix  B:  Derivations of the relationships between profit 
sharing and wage formation  
 
Based on straightforward calculations we find that the effect of wage on the mark-
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, as follows   
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15        One can also show that lower outsourcing cost will increase the total wage elasticity of labor 
demand, i.e.  0 <
dc
dη
, which lies in conformity with empirics, see e.g. Slaughter (2001).  20






















































1 2 1 , which can be 
rewritten as  
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γ  as  1 ≤ φ    (B2)  
 
Using (B2) and  () () w X Y η γ γ − + = 1  we can express (B1) as  





























































                                                                                                                               (B3) 
since  0 ≥
dw
d w η
 and as the wage elasticity of effort does not exceed one, i.e.  1 ≤ φ  
and  1
1













γ τ . In this case we have  0 1 > −
A
w Aw . 
Finally, the effect of profit sharing on the mark-up can be expressed by using 
() () () ⎥ ⎦
⎤
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2  so that we have   
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μ  so that this 
profit sharing total labor demand elasticity can be written as  
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. Using these (B4) can be written as  21
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where the first term is positive under the assumption  1
1













γ τ  and under 

























































 so that under this assumption the 
second term is negative so that in these assumptions the effect of profit sharing on 





Appendix C: Effect of profit sharing on indirect profit 
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